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COMMENT
NATIVE AMERICAN FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS IN
SACRED LAND: BURIED ONCE AGAIN
Michael N. Rpeani*
Introduction
When Congress enacted the first amendment, specifically the
free exercise clause,' it hoped to "erect a wall of separation
between church and state," thus enabling all individuals to
practice their religion free from governmental interference.2 Al-
though the religious guarantees contained in the first amendment
have "classically been one of the highest values of our society," '3
the Supreme Court necessarily has allowed the government to
limit the scope of the free exercise clause.4
Before a state is required to accommodate a religious practice
which conflicts with government action, the Supreme Court
requires a claimant to prove that (1) the religious beliefs are
sincere,5 (2) the religious practice is central to the religious
* B.A., 1983, University of Illinois; J.D., 1990, Illinois Institute of Technology
Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank two people who have been a
symbol of strength and a pillar of support throughout my life, and shall always receive
my deepest admiration-my parents.
First place award, 1988-89 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition.
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof .... U.S. CoNsr. amend. I. This amendment consists
of two distinct clauses: (1) the establishment clause, and (2) the free exercise clause.
This comment will focus solely on the free exercise clause and its application to Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
2. J. BuRNs, J. PELTASON, T. CRoNoi, GovERNMENT BY THE PEOPE 67 (13th ed.
1987).
3. "For religious freedom-the freedom to believe and to practice strange and, it
may be, foreign creeds-has classically been one of the highest values of our society."
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 612 (1960) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (requiring Amish employer
to pay social security taxes although doing so was against his religious beliefs); Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding a conviction for practicing polygamy,
even though the practice was within the tenets of the Mormon faith).
5. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). Here, the defendant was convicted
of fraud through his religious representations. In reversing the conviction, the Court
held that the jury should not have been instructed to assess the truth or falsity of the
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beliefs, 6 and (3) the government action places a substantial
burden on the practice of the religion.7 Once the claimant meets
this burden of proof, the government must accommodate the
religious practice, unless it can demonstrate a compelling state
interest which cannot be accomplished in a less restrictive, al-
ternative manner.8
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Associa-
tion,9 the United States Forest Service planned to complete the
construction of a road that traversed the Indians' sacred land.'0
The Indians sought to permanently enjoin the construction on
the basis that the road would severely interfere with their relig-
ious practices and, therefore, violate their first amendment
rights." The lower courts had followed the test articulated by
the Supreme Court and held that the construction of the road
would violate the Indians' free exercise rights and, accordingly,
granted the injunction. 12 However, the Supreme Court reversed
the decision, finding that the construction of the road did not
place a substantial burden on the practice of the Indians' relig-
ion.13
representations but, instead, should have been instructed as to whether the defendant
believed the representations to be true. Id. at 84-86. The Court also added, "Man's
relation to his God made no concern of the state. He was granted the right to worship
as he pleased and to answer to no man for the verity of his religious views.... The
first amendment does not select any one group or any one type of religion for preferred
treatment. It puts them all in that position." Id. at 87.
6. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
7. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1962).
8. Id. at 406-07.
9. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
10. The land has historically been used by the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians
for religious purposes. The district court did not dispute this fact as they found that
the religious practices dated back to the early nineteenth century. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
11. The Indians also claimed violation of: (1) the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988); (2) the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA), Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1988); (3) the Federal Water Pollution Prevention
and Control Act, Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 896, (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (1988)); (4) water and fishing rights reserved to
American Indians on the Hoopla Valley Indian Reservation, and the defendant's trust
responsibility towards those rights; (5) the Multiple Use Sustained-Yield Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 528-531; and (6) the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-
1687 (1988). The court's discussion and ultimate resolution of these claims are outside
the scope of this comment and thus will not be discussed here.
12. Northwest Indian Cemetery Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal.
1983), aff'd, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986).
13. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 447.
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Initially, this comment will review the development of the law
with respect to free exercise litigation and, in particular, Native
American free exercise litigation. Next, the comment will discuss
the facts of Lyng and the reasoning of the majority and dis-
senting opinions. Finally, the comment will illustrate how the
Court erred in finding that there was not a substantial burden
on Indian religious practice and how this error prevented the
Court from protecting the Native Americans' religious freedoms.
Historical Background
Early Restrictions on the Free Exercise Clause
The Supreme Court first restricted the free exercise clause in
Reynolds v. United States.1 4 There, Reynolds, in accordance
with the tenets of his Mormon faith, practiced polygamy and
was convicted under a federal statute that criminalized such
action.' 5 The Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress could
"not interfere with mere religious beliefs and opinions,"' 1 6 but
was "free to reach actions which were in violation of social
duties or subversive of good order."1 7 The Court upheld the
conviction by finding that polygamy was a practice which Con-
gress could prohibit because it transgressed against social val-
ues.'8 Later, the Court modified the Reynolds principle by stating
that "the Amendment embraces two concepts, freedom to be-
lieve and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but, in the nature
of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society."1 9 The Court's exami-
nation of state interest in light of interference with religious
freedoms remains a basis for testing free exercise claims today.
The Current Free Exercise Test
First, the Court has required a claimant to demonstrate that
his religious practice is "deeply rooted in religious belief," 20 not
14. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
15. 70 U.S. REv. STAT. § 5352 (1875).
16. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
17. Id. at 164. The Court also added that to permit such violation would make
the religious belief "superior to the law of the land, and in effect ... permit every
citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such
circumstances." Id. at 167.
18. The Court described the practice of polygamy as an "offense against society"
which would undermine marriage, a most important feature of social life. Id. at 164-
65.
19. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
20. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). Even though the Constitution
No. 2]
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just a matter of personal preference.2' In order to do so, the
claimant must prove that his religious beliefs are sincere. 2 Sin-
cerity refers to the Court's determination of a claimant's good
faith belief in his religious practice and not on any other fac-
tors.2 1 The Court does not suggest that a claimant's beliefs be
widely held by all members of a particular religion. 4 In most
cases, the claimant's sincerity will be accepted by the Court.21
Next, the claimant must prove that the religious practice is
indispensable to the claimant's religion.2 In Wisconsin v. Yoder,"
Amish parents claimed the state had violated their religious rights
by enforcing a compulsory public education statute which forced
their child to attend public school. The parents argued that
public schools were contrary to the Amish way of life and that
compliance with the statute would "endanger their own salvation
and that of their children." 23 In evaluating these claims, the
Court stated that "we must be careful to determine whether the
Amish religious faith and their mode of life [were] ... insep-
arable and interdependent." 2 9 The Court then found that the
Amish religious practices and their way of life were closely
did not define the word "religion," Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162, the Court has repeatedly
declined to become "arbiters of scriptural interpretation." Thomas v. Review Bd. of
Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981). The question of what represents
a religious belief "is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or
practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit first amendment protection." Id. at 714.
"Proof that the practice is deeply rooted in religious belief is sufficient. It is not the
province of government officials to determine religious orthodoxy." Teterud v. Bums,
522 F.2d 357, 360 (8th Cir. 1975). "There is no requirement that a religion meet any
organizational or doctrinal test in order to qualify for first amendment protection.
Orthodoxy is not an issue." Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1163
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
21. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (stating that a personal moral
code was not protected).
22. See supra note 5.
23. See Note, Land Use Regulation and the Free Exercise Clause, 84 CoLul. L.
Ray. 1562, 1573 n.65 (1984) [hereinafter Land Use Regulation].
24. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16
(1981) (no credence given to the fact that the claimant's religious belief was not held
by another member of claimant's religion).
25. See Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development: A New Breed of
Religion Cases, 1984 UTAH L. Ra,. 313, 315 [hereinafter Indian Worship]; Sequoyah
v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
26. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 209.
29. Id. at 215.
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intertwined and held that compliance with the statute would
violate their first amendment rights.A0
Finally, a claimant must prove that some form of govern-
mental action creates a substantial burden on the religion. 31 In
Sherbert v. Verner, the petitioner refused to work on Saturday,
the Sabbath day of her faith, and, hence, was discharged by
her employer. The state denied her unemployment compensation,
ruling that her reason for abstention from work did not consti-
tute "good cause" required by the statute.32 In reversing the
ruling, the Supreme Court held that the state's decision would
force the petitioner to choose between complying with a pre-
scribed regulation and abandoning her religious beliefs, which
would violate her first amendment rights. 33
The Court also has recognized a violation of the free exercise
clause when the state regulation or action coerces the claimant
to violate her religious convictions.3A Once the burden is estab-
lished, the state must accommodate the religious practice unless
.it can demonstrate a compelling interest which cannot be accom-
plished in a less restrictive, alternative manner.3 5
Native American Free Exercise Litigation
The unconventional nature of Native American religions has
caused a variety of free exercise litigation.3 6 This litigation in-
30. Id. at 218-19.
31. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
32. Id. at 401; see also Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment See. Div., 450
U.S. 707 (1981); and Hobble v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S.
136 (1987).
33. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
34. "[1it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of
the enactment as it operates against ... the practice of [their] religion." School Dist.
of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
35. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07. "[Oinly those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). See also Braunfield v. Braun,
399 U.S. 599 (1961).
36. For a general discussion of the Native American religions, see Note, Indian
Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of Public Lands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447,
1448-53 (1985); Michaelson, American Indian Religious Freedom Litigation: Promise
and Perils, 3 J. LAw & REL. 47, 59-64 (1985); Suagee, American Indian Religious
Freedom and Cultural Resources Management: Protecting Mother Earth's Caretakers.
10 Am. INmIN L. R-v. 1 (1982). For a general discussion of Native American free
exercise litigation, see Note, Native Americans and the Free Exercise Clause, 28 HAsTnNs
L.J. 1509 (1977).
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cludes Native American religious practices involving the use of
peyote, 37 protected animals, 38 and hair length.39 In all of these
free exercise cases, the courts have applied the Supreme Court's
analysis to determine whether the religious practice was protected
from government action.
One of the earliest Native American free exercise cases was
People v. Woody.A The defendant Woody, a member of the
Native American Church, was convicted under a California
statute prohibiting the use of peyote. 41 He claimed that his
religious beliefs required such use and that his conviction would
constitute a violation of his free exercise rights. Upon a thorough
examination of the history of the Native American Church and
its use of peyote, the court concluded that "[ihe 'meeting,' a
ceremony marked by the sacramental use of peyote, composes
the cornerstone of the peyote religion,"14z and that to prohibit
its use results in a virtual inhibition of the defendant's religion.43
Finally, the court held that the state's interest in enforcing the
law was not compelling" in this instance45 and reversed the
conviction."
37. The courts found that convicting the defendants for the use of peyote in
religious ceremonies violated their first amendment rights. See generally People v.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964); State v. Whittingham,
19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973), petition denied, 110 Ariz. 279, 517 P.2d 1275,
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974); Whitehom v. State, 561 P.2d 539 (1977 Okla. Crim.);
In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964). But see State v.
Soto, 21 Or. App. 794, 537 P.2d 142 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976) (state's
purpose of drug use laws is to preserve public health and safety as outweighing religious
claim, and hence conviction is upheld). See also infra note 121.
38. Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
39. Teterud v. Bums, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975); Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F.
Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
40. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). Note that at the time
the Court decided Lyng, its decision in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources
v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988) did not overrule Woody; it merely remanded the case to
determine if the Oregon Legislature intended to provide an exemption for the Native
Americans' use of peyote. The Court's decision in the rehearing of Smith appears to
overrule Woody. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
1595, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990). Although the author of this comment does
not agree with the Court's "reasoning" in the rehearing of Smith, any discussion of
this decision is beyond the scope of this comment.
41. CAL. HEALTH & SAsmny CODE § 11500 (West 1975).
42. Woody, 394 P.2d at 817. The court added, "It [peyote] is the sole means by
which defendants are able to experience their religion; without peyote defendants cannot
practice their faith." Id. at 820.
43. Id., 394 P.2d at 818.
44. Id., 394 P.2d at 820. The court compared the state's interest in the instant case
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss2/6
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Similarly, in Frank v. State,47 the Supreme Court of Alaska
upheld the rights of a Native American which conflicted with a
state game regulation.48 In Frank, an Alaskan Athabascan Indian
violated the state's game regulations by killing a moose to use
the meat in a religious burial ceremony. The court looked to
the history of the religion "and found that use of moose meat
in the burial ceremony was the centerpiece of the most important
ritual in Athabascan life and is the equivalent of sacred symbols
in other religions." 49 Therefore, a conviction would result in a
burden on his religious practice. Finally, the court held that the
state simply did not have a compelling interest in maintaining
a healthy moose population. 0 Thus, the burden was unjustified
and the conviction was reversed.
Recently, the courts have been confronted with cases involving
governmental development of land which effectively prevent
Native American religious practices.5 1 In Sequoyah v. Tennessee
with the Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds, and found that the interests in Reynolds
(undermining the morals of people) exceeded that in Woody.
45. The court also implied that the number of exemptions that would be granted
due to this holding would not pose a serious threat to the enforcement of the drug
laws. Id., 394 P.2d at 818.
46. Id., 394 P.2d at 822.
47. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
48. ALAI CA AD MN. CODE tit. 5, §§ 81.140(b), 81.320 (July 1975).
49. Frank, 604 P.2d at 1073. Just as the Woody court found that peyote was
central to the religion, this court found that "[flood is the cornerstone of the ritual."
Id. at 1071.
50. Furthermore, the state unsuccessfully argued that to grant an exemption in this
case would lead to widespread civil disobedience of the state's game regulations. How-
ever, in falling to provide any evidence on the matter, the court rejected this argument
by stating that "[justifications founded only on fear and apprehension are insufficient
to overcome rights asserted under the first amendment." Id. at 1074 (quoting Teterud
v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357, 361-62 (8th Cir. 1975)).
51. See generally Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights to Use of Public
Lands, 63 B.U.L. Ray. 141 (1983) [hereinafter Free Exercise Rights]; Note, Native
Americans' Access to Religious Sites: Underprotected Under the Free Exercise Clause?,
26 B.C.L. Rav. 463, 475-81 (1985) [hereinafter Religious Sites]; Indian Worship, supra
note 25, at 321-22; Land Use Regulation, supra note 23; Note, American Indian Sacred
Religious Sites and Government Development: A Conventional Analysis in an Uncon-
ventional Setting, 85 hIcH. L. Rev. 771 (1987). See also Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Badoni v. Higginson,
638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Inupiat Community
of Arctic Slope v. United States, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
820 (1985); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956
(1983); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1977 (1983).
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Valley Authority,52 Wilson v. Block,53 and Crow v. Gullet,54 the
Native American plaintiffs claimed that the government's con-
struction of artificial structures on their sacred land violated the
free exercise clause. Although the courts did not question the
sincerity of the beliefs, the Sequoyah and Wilson courts rejected
the claim on the basis that the Indians had not proved that the
sacred land was central to their religious practice. 5 The Crow
court, on the other hand, found that the sacred land was central
to the Indians' religious practice. However, the Crow court
rejected the claim by finding that the Indian tribes' access to
the land was actually increased by the construction and, there-
fore, the construction did not impose a burden on the religion.56
In contrast to the other sacred land cases is Badoni v. Hig-
ginson,57 in which the Tenth Circuit reached the compelling
interest stage in the free exercise analysis. In Badoni, Indians
sought to enjoin the completion of a dam, which would prevent
Indian access to sacred land. Although the court concluded that
the Indian plaintiffs met their burden of proof,58 it held that
the government interest in providing natural energy resources
was compelling and the dam was located in the least restrictive
alternative location.59 As a result, the court denied relief to the
Indians.
The Supreme Court has heard relatively few Native American
free exercise cases. 60 However, in Bowen v. Roy,61 the Supreme
52. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). 1159 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). See also Free Exercise Rights, supra note 51, at 143-
46; Religious Sites, supra note 51, at 475-81; Pepper, The Condrum of the Free Exercise
Clause-Some Reflections on Recent Cases, 9 N. Ky. L. Rnv. 265, 277-90 (1982).
53. 709 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also Note, Constitutional Law: Religious
Freedom and Public Land Use, 20 LAiN & WATER L. REv. 109 (1985) (criticizing the
court's decision).
54. 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982).
55. The Sequoyah court stated that the Indians did not demonstrate that the land
was inseparable from their way of life (Yoder), the cornerstone of their religious
observance (Frank), or plays the central role in their religious ceremonies and practices
(Woody). Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164. In reaching this conclusion, the court appeared
to be persuaded by the fact that the exact location of the religious sites were unknown
to the Cherokee until archaeological expeditions occurred. Further, there was no showing
that any other Cherokees used the land for religious purposes. However, see the
dissenting opinion where the judge believes that the case was "a confusing and essentially
uncharted area of law" and recommended that the case be remanded to give the
Cherokee a chance to offer proof. Id. at 1165.
56. Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 791.
57. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
58. Id. at 177.
59. Id. at 181.
60. Except for Bowen v. Roy, the only other-rcent Native American free exercise
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss2/6
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Court expressly declined to apply the traditional free exercise
test in the setting of "the enforcement of a facially neutral and
uniformly applied" statute.62 In Roy, Native American plaintiffs
were denied food stamp benefits because they refused to supply
their daughter's Social Security number to the appropriate state
agency, in violation of a state statute.6 3 The parents claimed
that the use of their daughter's number would violate their
Native American religious beliefs. 4 In rejecting the claim, the
Court found that although the government action offended the
plaintiff's religious beliefs, the government practice did not
impair his freedom "to believe, express and exercise his relig-
* ion." 65 The Court added that "the free exercise clause simply
cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its
own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious
beliefs of particular citizens.... [It] does not afford an indi-
vidual a right to dictate the conduct of the government's internal
procedures."66
Facts of the Case
The Northwest California Indians traditionally have used land
located in the Chimney Rock Section of the Six Rivers National
Forest as the site for their religious ceremonies. 67 However, in
order to complete a seventy-five mile road linking two California
case is Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988),
rev'd, 58 U.S.L.W. 4433 (1990).
61. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
62. Id. at 707. This holding conflicts with the Yoder Court's finding that a
"regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless, offend the consti-
tutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise
of religion." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972). Although this author feels
that the Roy decision is incorrect in the light of the Yoder case, the critique of Roy is
outside the scope of this comment. For a thorough critique of Roy, see Comment, A
New Category of Free Exercise Claims: Protection for Individuals Objecting to Gov-
ernmental Actions That Impede Their Religions, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1557, 1562-68
(1987).
63. Under 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25) and 7 U.S.C. § 2025(e), in order to obtain food
stamps, the petitioners were required to provide the welfare department with social
security numbers of all of those in the household. Roy, 476 U.S. at 695.
64. Roy believes that the use of his daughter's social security number would "rob
her of her spirit." Id. at 696.
65. Id. at 700-01 & n.6.
66. Id. at 699-700.
67. See supra note 10.
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
332 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
towns,6 8 the United States Forest Service decided to construct a
six mile road through this sacred land.
Prior to the completion of the road, the Forest Service re-
ceived an environmental impact report 69 that described the land
as "integral" to the practice of the Indians' religious practices70
and that these practices greatly depended on "privacy, silence
and an undisturbed natural setting." 7' Furthermore, the report
stated that the road would have devastating effects on the
religion which had been described as the "lifeway of the Indi-
ans."'72 For these reasons, the report recommended that the road
should not be completed. However, the Forest Service did not
adopt the recommendation.
The Indians claimed that the road would violate their free
exercise rights 3 and sought an injunction forbidding its comple-
tion. The United States District Court for the Northern District
of California found that the road created a substantial burden
on the Indians' religious practices,74 which was not justified by
a compelling state interest.7s Therefore, the court granted a
68. The towns of Gasquet and Orleans were being linked and the road is referred
to throughout the opinion as the G-O road. The state was also going to use the land
to harvest timber, however, as this case was being appealed, California passed a law
prohibiting such use. As this issue was not before the Court, no further discussion of
the harvest plan is necessary.
69. D. THEODORATUS, CULTURAL RESOURCES OF THE CHiniEy RoCK SECTION, GAs-
QuET-Oa LaNs RoAD, Six RvEas NATIONAL FoResT (1979) (hereinafter TnEo. REPoRT].
70. The Theo. Report described the area as an "integral and indispensable part of
the Indian religious conceptualization and practice." Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988) (quoting the Theo. Report).
71. "[The] successful use of the [area] is dependent upon and facilitated by certain
qualities of the physical environment, the most important of which are privacy, silence,
and an undisturbed natural setting." Id. (quoting the Theo. Report).
72. The route "would cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred areas
which are an integral and necessary part of the belief systems and lifeway of Northwest
California Indian peoples." Id. (quoting the Theo Report).
73. See supra note 11.
74. "(Clonstruction of the Chimney Rock Section ... would seriously impair the
Indian plaintiff's use of the high country for religious practices." Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 594 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
75. The state claimed that the G-O road would "(1) increase the quantity of timber
accessible to harvesting in the Blue Creek Unit; (2) stimulate employment in the regional
timber industry; (3) provide recreational access to the Blue Creek Unit as well as permit
through recreational traffic on the G-O road; (4) further the efficient administration of
Six Rivers National Forest by the Forest Service; and (5) increase the price of bids on
future timber sales in the Orleans area of Six Rivers National Forest .... ." Id. at 595.
The lower court then found that the completion of the road would "not materially
serve several of the claimed governmental interests." Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss2/6
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permanent injunction. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision.76
The Majority's Reasoning
The Supreme Court held that it could not distinguish the
construction of a road in the present case from the use of a
Social Security number in Bowen v. Roy.7 7 The court reasoned
that in neither case did the government coerce the individuals
to violate their religious beliefs 28 Thus, although the majority
of the Court found that the completion of the road would have
devastated the Indians' religious practices,79 the Court did not
find a substantial burden on religion. Furthermore, the Court
noted that the Indians did not unanimously oppose the construc-
tion of the road,80 and did not object to the use of the areas
by visitors, other Indians, and forest rangers."' These facts
provided additional support for the Court's holding that the
road did not substantially burden the religion.
The Court also stated that the construction of the road was
not an outright prohibition against religious practice and, there-
fore, the Indians were not compelled to stop practicing their
beliefs.82 The Court distinguished the decisions in Yoder and
Sherbert by stating that the state regulations in those cases acted
to bar the plaintiffs from practicing their beliefs. 3
Next, the majority focused on the government's effort to
minimize the impact of the road on the Indians' religious activ-
ities.84 The Court viewed the Forest Service's voluntary com-
mission of the religious and cultural impact study and the fact
that no specific ritual sites were disturbed as evidence of the
state's attempt to select a less restrictive, alternative route. 8 The
76. 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986).
77. 476 U.S. 693 (1986). The Court also refused to distinguish Roy on the basis
that "the religious liberty here is 'significantly greater,' or on the ground that the
government practice in Roy was 'purely mechanical' whereas this case involves a 'case-
by-case substantive determination as to how a particular unit of land will be managed."'
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449. The Court correctly responded to this request by stating that it
"cannot determine the truth of the underlying beliefs that led to the religious objections
here.., and accordingly cannot weigh the adverse effects on the appellees in Roy and
compare them with the adverse effects of the Indian respondents." Id. at 449-50.
78. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449.
79. Id. at 451.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 452.
82. Id. at 450.
83. Id. at 451.
84. Id. at 454.
85. Id.
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Court concluded that everything short of abandoning the road
was done to accommodate the religion.86
Finally, the majority emphasized that in a society filled with
many diverse religions, a "government simply could not operate
if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and
desires." 87 The Court then further justified its decision by stating
that an opposite ruling would have resulted in a serious dimi-
nution of the government's property rights.88
The Dissent
Justice Brennan disagreed that Roy was controlling in this
case. He reasoned that the majority ignored Roy's emphasis on
internal matters, whereas Lyng represented a case with signifi-
cant external effects on the Indians. 89 Justice Brennan also
distinguished Roy on the basis that the Roy Court held that the
use of the Social Security number did not impair the claimant's
freedom to exercise his religious beliefs.9 On the other hand,
in Lyng, the road had devastating effects on the religion.
Justice Brennan's dissent noted that the road created a sub-
stantial burden on the Indians' religion. 91 He compared the
interrelationship between the Amish religion and their lifestyle
in Yoder.with the interrelationship between the Indian religion
and their lifestyle in Lyng and found that the burden was just
as substantial. 92 Furthermore, he stated that the Indians' burden
is more substantial than the burden in Sherbert.93 In Sherbert,
government action made the practice more expensive, whereas
in Lyng, the practice of religion was rendered impossible.
Utilizing the traditional free exercise analysis, Justice Brennan
failed to find a compelling state interest for constructing the
road.9 4 Instead, he claimed that the majority placed too much
importance on the government's property rights over the Indians'
86. Id. The Court also stated that the incomplete road would result in a large
economic waste.
87. Id. at 452. The Court then stated that it is the legislature's responsibility to
provide for exemptions such as this case.
88. "Even without anticipating future cases, the diminution of the Government's
property rights, and the concomitant subsidy of the Indian religion, would in this case
be far from trivial .... " Id. at 453. The Court then noted that the district court
permanently enjoined more than 17,000 acres of public land.
89. Id. at 470-72.
90. Id. at 472.
91. Id. at 467.
92. Id. at 466.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 465.
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religious interests.95 Brennan ultimately concluded that the ex-
istence of a substantial burden on the Indians' religious practices
was not justified by a compelling state interest.9 6
Analysis
The Lyng decision is an unjustified departure from the tra-
ditional free exercise analysis. 97 By improperly holding that the
Roy decision controlled, the Court effectively freed itself from
applying the traditional analysis, which ultimately would have
resulted in a decision in favor of the Indians.
As the dissent correctly recognized, 98 the Court erred in failing
to distinguish Roy from Lyng. First, the Roy Court explicitly
restricted the application of its holding to situations involving a
"facially neutral statute uniformly applied." 99 In Lyng, there
was no statute involved. Even if the road construction was
analogized to a statute, it certainly cannot be argued that it was
uniformly applied, as was the statute in Roy.
Second, the nature of the injury to religion caused by the
government action provided another basis for distinction. In
Roy, the Court concluded that the government action did not
inhibit religious practices.' °° In Lyng, however, the majority
conceded that the construction of the road would destroy the
Indians' ability to practice their religion.10' Because the govern-
ment actions as well as the injuries to the religious practices in
the two cases were of a completely different nature, Roy was
distinguishable. Therefore, the Court should have tested the
government action in Lyng under the traditional free exercise
analysis.
Applying the traditional free exercise analysis, the Indians
in Lyng easily satisfied the requirements. First, the Indians'
religious beliefs were sincere. The Court's reference to the fact
that the Indians did not unanimously oppose the road does not
demonstrate a lack of sincerity. As noted earlier, the Supreme
95. Id. at 473.
96. Id. at 465.
97. The traditional free exercise analysis refers to the requirements of sincerity,
centrality, substantial burden, and compelling state interests. This method of analysis
was properly used by all of the prior lower court Native American sacred land cases.
98. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
101. "The Government does not dispute, and we have no reason to doubt, that the
... road-building projects at issue in this case could have devastating effects on
traditional Indian religious practices." Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451.
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Court has held that it is irrelevant whether a member of a
religious group has a different belief than other members of
the same group, so long as the belief is sincere. 02 Here, the
Lyng Court did not dispute the sincerity of the Indians' be-liefs. 10 3
Second, the Indians met the centrality requirement. The trial
produced convincing evidence which demonstrated that the land
was a source of essential religious and medicinal powers.' 4 The
tribal leaders acquired these powers from particular land sites
and disseminated them for the benefit of the members of the
community. 0 Evidence also indicated that impairment of the
religious practices would undermine the community. 06 This
evidence provided a basis for concluding that the Indians'
religious practices were "inseparable and interdependent"' 07
with the Indian way of life, much like the Amish religion was
intertwined with the respondents' way of life in Yoder. Fur-
thermore, the land can be considered a cornerstone of the
religious practice, just as the Woody court found in the Indians'
use of peyote.
The Indians in Lyng also proved that the construction of
the road would constitute a substantial burden on the practice
of their religion. The evidence at trial demonstrated that the
silence and privacy of the sacred land were essential to their
religious ceremonies. 08 Since the construction of the road would
seriously damage the visual, aural, and environmental qualities
102. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
103. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 447.
104. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586,
591-92 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
105. This is explained in Peterson:
The religious power these individuals [tribe leaders] acquire in the high country lends
meaning to these tribal ceremonies, thereby enhancing the spiritual welfare of the
entire tribal community. Medicine women in the tribes travel to the high country to
pray, to obtain spiritual power, and to gather medicines. They then return to the
tribe to administer to the sick the healing power gained in the high country ....
rd.
106. "Degradation of the high country and impairment of such training would carry
'a very real threat of undermining the tribal communities and religious practices as they
exist today."' Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 594 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 218 (1972)).
107. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
108. "Individuals hike into the high country ... to seek religious guidance or
personal 'power' through 'engaging in emotional and spiritual exchange with the creator.'
Such exchange is made possible by the solitude, quietness, and pristine environment
found in the high country." Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 591.
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of the high country, 0 9 there clearly was a substantial burden
on their religion. As Justice Brennan noted, the burden was
even greater than that in Sherbert because here the state goes
beyond coercing and actually prohibited the exercise of the
Indians' practices."10 The type of interference that the state
would create through completion of the road certainly would
result in a virtual inhibition of religion, which the Woody court
expressly prohibited."'
Finally, the state did not demonstrate a compelling interest
that would justify the substantial burden that would be imposed
on the Indians' religion. The majority was silent on the state's
interests and instead focused on the state's attempt to place
the road at the least restrictive route.112 However, according to
the traditional analysis, if there is not a compelling state in-
terest, the Court does not need to discuss any less restrictive
measures. The district court properly found that the state's
interests in achieving minor economic and recreational goals
were insufficient to justify the burden."' Certainly, these in-
terests were not comparable to the paramount public health
and welfare interests that the Court has protected even when
the action has infringed on religious rights." 4
The Court's decision in Lyng is quite peculiar. The Court
contradicted itself when it conceded that the road would dev-
astate the Indians' religious practices, but then held that the
road did not constitute a substantial burden on the religion."5
109. Id. at 592 & nn.5-6.
110. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 466 (1988).
111. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
112. Lyng, 485 U.S. -at 454. Aside from the fact that, under Roy, the Court did
not have to discuss the compelling state interests, the Court's analysis of the state's
attempted accommodation is weak. The Court viewed the Forest Service's commission
of the religious study as a valid attempt to accommodate the Native Americans. However,
the. fact is that the Forest Service ignored the recommendation of the study to abandon
the project. This fact suggests that the Service may have viewed the study as a superficial
attempt to accommodate the religion.
Furthermore, the fact that the road avoided sites where specific rituals were performed
is irrelevant since the evidence established that the road damaged the privacy and silence
of the environment.
Finally, the Court's emphasis on the fact that an opposite decision would result in
a large economic waste cannot withstand analysis. The Forest Service was fully aware
of the harmful effects of the road before the road was started. Any economic waste
would have resulted directly from the Service's decision to ignore the study's recom-
mendation.
113. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
115. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451.
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Furthermore, the Court held that the Bowen v. Roy"16 decision
controls Lyng when there were significant distinguishing factors
between the two cases. Finally, since the Roy decision did not
require the Court to address any of the traditional free exercise
requirements, the Court erroneously examined the substantial
burden and less restrictive means factors.
Why would the Court follow a case that can be easily
distinguished only to depart from that case and return to the
analysis that the Roy Court held inapplicable? Perhaps the
reason for the Court's behavior was because it knew that the
state did not have a compelling interest to construct the road.
If the Court followed the traditional free exercise analysis, the
Indians would have prevailed and the decision would have
created a serious diminution of government property rights."7
In adopting Roy, the Court could circumvent the state interest
problem and, hence, maintain the government's property in-
terests.
Perhaps the Court discussed the traditional requirements in
an attempt to clear its conscience or simply to create an obstacle
for future challenges of this decision. In any event, Lyng widens
the government's power, infringes on religious freedoms with-
out demonstration of a compelling state interest, and results
in a gross contraction of first amendment rights.
Conclusion
In order to prove a violation of the free exercise clause, the
Supreme Court requires a claimant to prove that the state
substantially burdened the practice of a religion." 8 Once the
claimant meets this standard, the state must demonstrate that
it had a compelling interest that could not be accomplished in
a less restrictive manner." 9 In Roy, the Court carved out an
exception to this analysis when the government action involves
a neutral statute uniformly applied to the public. In these cases,
the Court does not have to apply the traditional free exercise
analysis. The Lyng Court improperly extends this exception.
116. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
117. This author suggests that the Court's paranoia concerning the loss of govern-
ment property rights led them to gant certiorari in this case, not necessarily because
they wanted to clarify the reach of the free exercise clause. After all, certiorari had
been denied in all of the past sacred land cases.
118. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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As a result, the Court's decision results in a blatant violation
of the free exercise clause.' 20
120. Subsequent to Lyng, the Court denied an Indian unemployment compensation
benefits because he used peyote during a Native American religious ceremony. The
peyote had been a cornerstone of the religion for centuries, and the Court's decision
effecitvely prevents the Indian from practicing his religion. Employment Div., Dep't of
Human Resources v Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990).
At first blush, the trio of Supreme Court Native American religious decisions (Roy,
Lyng, and Smith) appear to be isolated to the Indians. However, these decisions have
a detrimental effect on our first amendment freedoms because they constrict our
fundamental rights, regardless of religious belief. The decisions are tragic because, as
Justice Mathew Tobriner of the California Supreme Court stated:
IThe right to free religious expression embodies a precious heritage of our history.
In a mass society, which presses at every point toward conformity, the protection
of a self-expression, however unique, of the individual and the group becomes even
more important. The varying currents of the subcultures that flow into the main-
stream of our nation life give it depth and beauty.
People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 727, 394 P.2d 813, 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77 (1964).
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